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ABSTRACT 
  
POLICY ANOMALY REPORTING FOR DISTRIBUTED FIREWALLS 
 
Firewall is a protective device which is installed between two networks. 
Firewall functionality depends on the filtering rules and their order. All rule relations 
must be considered in order to determine correct rule order. In this thesis, anomaly 
discovery algorithms are implemented for single and distributed firewall environments 
in a software tool called “Policy Anomaly Checker”. A number of tests are performed 
using different policies and network topologies in order to obtain operational values of 
these algorithms. 
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ÖZET 
 
DAĞITIK GÜVENLİK DUVARLARI İÇİN POLİTİKA ANOMALİ 
RAPORLAMA 
 
Güvenlik duvarı iki network arasına kurulan koruyucu bir cihazdır. Güvenlik 
duvarının işlevselliği filtreleme kurallarına ve bu kuralların sırasına bağlıdır. Doğru 
kural sırasını belirlemek için kurallar arasındaki bütün ilişkiler dikkate alınmalıdır. Bu 
tezde tek ve dağıtık güvenlik duvarı ortamları için  anomali bulma algoritmaları 
“Politika Anomali Belirleyicisi” adı verilen bir yazılım aracında  uygulanmıştır.  Bu 
algoritmaların operasyon değerlerinin belirlenmesi için farklı kural setleri ve ağ yapıları 
kullanılarak testler yapılmıştır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Firewalls are fundamental elements in network security. Most of the dangers of 
the Internet may be blocked by installing a firewall. Firewall is installed at a point 
where the internal network connects to the Internet. It filters out unacceptable traffic 
coming from or going to internal network. Filtering decision is based on a set of 
ordered rules. Correct operation of the firewall is dependent on the filtering rules 
Administrator must consider all rule relations in order to determine of correct 
rule order.  Increase in the number of the filtering rules results in the increase the 
potential of anomaly occurrence in the firewall policy. In single firewall environment 
policy may include intra-firewall anomalies, where the same packet may match more 
than one filtering rule. In distributed firewall environments, firewalls might also have 
inter-firewall anomalies when individual firewalls in the same path perform different 
filtering actions on the same traffic. 
The main concern of this study is to implement anomaly discovery algorithms 
(Al-Shaer and Hamed 2004) for reporting an anomaly that might exist in any firewall 
policy in single and distributed firewall environments. In order to implement these 
algorithms a tree-based filtering representation is used. These algorithms are 
implemented using Java programming language in a software tool called “Policy 
Anomaly Checker”.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the single and 
distributed firewall environments. Firewall policies and their tree-based representation 
are also identified in this chapter. Then in order to determine anomalies among filtering 
rules, relations are described as well. Chapter 3 explains anomaly discovery algorithms 
for single and distributed firewalls. Design and implementation of “Policy Anomaly 
Checker” are also explained in this chapter. Chapter 4 describes experiments and 
evaluation which are done using “Policy Anomaly Checker”. Finally, Chapter 5 gives 
the conclusion of this thesis work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
In this chapter firewalls and firewall policies are explored. In addition, 
distributed firewalls and policy anomalies are explained. 
2.1. Firewalls 
Firewall is a protective device which is installed between two networks. A 
firewall usually separates an internal network from the Internet (Figure2.1). Firewall 
restricts people to entering or leaving at a controlled point and it prevents attackers 
from getting close to other defenses. All traffic between two networks must pass 
through the firewall and only authorized traffic, defined by the local security policy, 
can be allowed to pass.  
 
Figure 2.1. A Firewall Usually Separates an Internal Network from the Internet 
(Source: Chapman and Zwicky 1995) 
The function of the firewall is to provide secure access to and from the internal 
network. Any packet that attempts to enter or leave at the entry point is first examined 
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by the firewall. Firewall decides either to accept or to discard the packet according to 
different fields of the packet. 
Firewalls are included in network security approaches to protect internal 
networks. Internet firewall prevents the dangers of the Internet from spreading to 
internal network. 
2.1.1. Types of Firewalls 
There are several types of firewalls. Packet filter firewalls, stateful inspection 
firewalls, application-proxy gateway firewalls are fundamental types of firewalls. 
2.1.1.1. Packet Filter Firewalls  
Packet filtering firewalls operate at Layer 3 of the OSI model. Packet filtering 
firewalls route IP packets selectively between internal and external hosts. IP packet’s 
header contains four information; IP source address, IP destination address, IP protocol 
type and some characteristics of layer 4 such as the source and destination port. 
Firewall examines packets and allows or blocks them according to a rule set. Table 2.1 
shows sample packet filter firewall rule set which blocks all tcp traffic coming from the 
network 192.168.1.* except http (Wack, et al. 2002).                                                                                                                                               
Table 2.1. Sample Packet Filter Firewall Rule Set 
Order Protocol Source 
Address 
Source Port  Destination 
Address 
Destination 
Port 
Action 
1 tcp 192.168.1.* any any 80 accept 
2 tcp 192.168.1.* any any any deny 
 
The rule set may be much larger and detailed for most firewalls. When a 
firewall accepts a packet, it examines source and destination addresses and ports of the 
packet. Then it starts at the top of the rule set and works down through the rules. When 
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a rule that permits or denies the packet is found, firewall passes the packet through the 
firewall or drops the packet without passing it through the firewall (Wack, et al. 2002). 
2.1.1.2. Stateful Inspection Firewalls   
Stateful inspection firewalls are packet filters that incorporate added awareness 
of the OSI model data at Layer 4. A stateful firewall is able to hold in memory the state 
of the connection. It depends on the three-way handshake of the TCP protocol. When a 
client initiates a new connection, it sends a packet with the SYN bit set in the packet 
header. All packets with the SYN bit set are considered by the firewall as NEW 
connections. If the service which the client has requested is available on the server, the 
service will reply to the SYN packet with a packet in which both the SYN and the ACK 
bit are set. The client will then respond with a packet in which only the ACK bit is set, 
and the connection will enter the ESTABLISHED state. Such a firewall will pass all 
outgoing packets through but will only allow incoming packets if they are part of an 
ESTABLISHED connection (Wack, et al. 2002).                                                                                                                                                   
2.1.1.3. Application Proxy Gateway Firewalls 
Application-proxy gateway firewall is an application that runs on a firewall 
system. The user's client program talks to this proxy server instead of directly talk to 
the "real" server out on the Internet. The proxy server evaluates requests from the client 
and decides which to pass on and which to discard. If a request is approved, the proxy 
server talks to the real server on behalf of the client and proceeds to relay requests from 
the client to the real server and to relay the real server's answers back to the client 
(Chapman and Zwicky 1995). 
2.2. Distributed Firewalls 
Traditionally a firewall is installed as network gateway and same access policy 
is enforced for every computer on the network that is protected by the firewall. Same 
rule set is applied at the network boundary. This single point of interconnection 
between networks has some disadvantages. If the access control policy is incorrect, the 
protected network will be at risk. For example if malicious traffic is able to pass 
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through to firewall then all hosts on the network could be vulnerable to this malicious 
traffic. Also traditional firewall will not provide a protection for any attack from the 
same network. In addition a network firewall can be a bottleneck (Grant, et al. 2001). 
Distributed firewall system is not a single system that acts as a gateway between 
two networks. By removing this single choke point, the network bottleneck is 
eliminated. In distributed firewall technology, an access control mechanism is 
distributed to each host which requires protection. Firewall functionality is removed 
from a single system. The unique access control for each of the network systems allows 
different levels of security to be implemented on computer system on the same network 
(Grant, et al. 2001). 
A policy language, a policy distribution scheme and certificates are components 
of distributed firewall environment. Policy language defines what sort of connections 
are permitted or prohibited. Basically it is equivalent to packet filtering rules. Policy 
language should also support credentials, for delegation of rights and authentication 
purposes (Ioannidis, et al. 2000). While traditional firewalls usually use the IP address 
as an identifier, distributed firewalls use cryptographic certificates as identifier since 
distributed firewalls are independent of topology. Certificates enable the making 
decisions without knowledge of the physical location of the host. Public-key 
cryptography mechanisms are most often applied in contemporary implementations.  
A sample policy is shown in Figure 2.2. In this sample if the certificate 
identifies the source as mailgw.example.com the packet will be accepted. If the 
certificate name is different, the packet will be dropped. (Bellovin 1999) 
 
Figure 2.2. A Sample Policy Configuration File 
 (Source: Bellovin 1999) 
Policy distribution scheme is used to enabling policy control from central point. 
Distribution scheme defines type of the security policy delegation to the members of 
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the network. Policies are distributed according to one of the following distribution 
scheme:  
• Policies as well as credentials can be pushed to every single end point in the 
policy domain. 
• Policies and credentials can be pulled from a trusted repository during 
initialization. 
• Policies are pulled during initialization of the policy verifier whereas 
credentials for authentication mechanisms remain on a trusted repository 
and are requested whenever communication traffic is reaching a node from a 
yet unknown host. 
In implementation of distributed firewall technology, policy languages are 
translated into some internal format by a compiler. This policy file is distributed to all 
the protected hosts by the system management software. A mechanism applies the 
security policy to incoming packets or connections. And incoming packet accepted or 
rejected by each host according to policy and the cryptographically verified identity of 
each sender (Ioannidis, et al. 2000).  
Different variations can exist in implementation of distributed firewall 
technology. These variations are called hybrid firewall that is the combination of 
traditional firewall and distributed firewall. Some hybrid firewalls do not make use of 
cryptographic credentials and still rely on topological properties of the underlying 
network through inspection of the connecting nodes network address.  
2.3. Firewall Policies 
A firewall policy should describe how the firewall is managed. Before a firewall 
policy created, some of the analysis must be performed. The result of the analysis must 
identify network applications traffic which the firewall system handles and the details 
of which applications can traverse a firewall. 
The steps for firewall policy creation are as follows (Wack, et al. 2002):                                                              
• Identification of network necessary applications, 
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• Identification of vulnerabilities associated with applications,  
• Cost-benefits analysis of methods for securing the applications,  
• Creation of firewall rule set based on applications traffic. 
Most firewalls use rule sets for implementing security controls. The 
functionality of a firewall is determined by these rule sets. Nearly all rule sets, contain 
the following fields, as a minimum (Wack, et al. 2002):                                                                                                                                                   
• The source address of the packet, address of the computer system or device 
the network packet originated from (an IP address such as 192.168.1.1).  
• The destination address of the packet, address of the computer system or 
device the network packet is trying to reach (e.g., 192.168.1.2).  
• The type of traffic, the specific network protocol being used to communicate 
between the source and destination systems or devices. 
• Possibly some characteristics of the Layer 4, the source and destination 
ports of the sessions (e.g., TCP:80 for the destination port belonging to a 
web server, TCP:1320 for the source port belonging to a personal computer 
accessing the server). 
• Sometimes, information pertaining to which interface of the router the 
packet came from and which interface of the router the packet is destined 
for. Useful for routers with three or more network interfaces.  
• An action, such as Deny or Permit the packet (Wack, et al. 2002)                                             
Firewall rule set should be kept as simple as possible and should be building to 
be as specific as possible. Unless the traffic type and connections have been specially 
permitted, inbound traffic should be blocked by default policy. Common format of a 
rule in a firewall policy is as follows: 
<order> <protocol> <src_ip> <src_port> <dst_ip> <dst_port> <action>  
The order field determines the position of rule in rule set; protocol field 
specifies transport protocol of the packet. The IP addresses of the source and 
destination are specified respectively by src_ip and dst_ip fields. The   port addresses 
of the source and destination of the packet are specified by src_port and dst_port fields 
(Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002).  
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2.3.1. Firewall Policy Representation  
Policy representation modeling is important for implementing management 
techniques and visualizing the firewall policy structure. Al-Shaer and Hamed (2002) 
described a policy representation model in their research “Design and Implementation 
of Firewall Policy Advisor Tools”. They represented the firewall policy by a single 
rooted tree which is called the policy tree. Fields of the rules are represented as nodes 
in policy tree. And a possible value of the associated field is represented as a branch of 
this node. The protocol field is represented as a root node of a policy tree, and action 
field is represented as a leaf node. Every tree path starting at the root and ending at a 
leaf represents a rule in the policy. Rules that have the same field value at a specific 
node, will share the same branch representing that value. A firewall policy example is 
illustrated in Figure 2.3 and policy tree model for this policy example is illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.3. A Firewall Policy Example 
 (Source: Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002) 
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Figure 2.4. Policy Tree for the Firewall Policy in Figure 2.3                                     
(Source: Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002) 
Rule 1 to 9 all have the same protocol field value “tcp” and they share the same 
branch at protocol node. Rules 1 and 5 have different src_ip field value while rules 2, 4, 
6 and 7 share the same src_ip field value. Similarly, rules 3 and 8 share the same src_ip 
branch. Rules 9, 10 and 12 share the same branch at protocol node with field value 
“udp”. Notice that rules 8 and 4 appear on rules 2 and 3 while they have separate 
branches also, because they have superset relations with other rules. Relations between 
filtering rules will be introduced later in this chapter.  
2.4. Policy Anomalies 
Correct operation of the firewall is dependent on the filtering rules. Therefore, 
administrator must give special attention to proper rule placement in filtering rule set. 
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In order to analyze the firewall policy modeling of firewall rule relations is 
necessary. The model which is created by Al-Shaer and Hamed (2002) and introduced 
in their research “Design and Implementation of Firewall Policy Advisor Tools” is used 
to analyze firewall policies. They defined all possible relations between filtering rules 
and they proved that there is no other relation exists. Definitions of relations are in 
Appendix A.  
Exactly matched: Rules Rx and Ry are exactly matched if every field in Rx is 
equal to the corresponding field in Ry (Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002). 
For the following rules, they are exactly matched because of all corresponding 
fields in both rules are equal.  
1: tcp, 192.168.1.3, any, 193.140.248.*, 21, accept  
2: tcp, 192.168.1.3, any, 193.140.248.*, 21, deny  
Inclusively matched: Rules Rx and Ry are inclusively matched if they do not 
exactly match and if every field in Rx is a subset or equal to the corresponding field in 
Ry (Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002). 
For the following rules, every field in rule 1 is subset or equal to corresponding 
field in rule 2 and every field in rule 2 is superset or equal to corresponding field in rule 
1. In this relation rule 1 is called subset match, rule 2 is called superset match. 
1: tcp, 192.168.1.3, any, 193.140.248.*, 21, accept  
2: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 193.140.248.*, any, deny  
 
Completely disjoint: Rules Rx and Ry are completely disjoint if every field in 
Rx is not a subset and not a superset and not equal to the corresponding field in Ry (Al-
Shaer and Hamed 2002). 
For the following rules, they are completely disjoint. Every corresponding fields 
in both rules are not subset and not superset and not equal. 
1: tcp, 192.168.1.3, 2000, 10.10.1.4, 21, accept  
2: tcp, 192.168.1.5, 3000, 10.10.1.11, 80, deny  
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Partially disjoint: Rules Rx and Ry are partially disjoint (or partially matched) 
if there is at least one field in Rx that is a subset or a superset or equal to the 
corresponding field in Ry, and there is at least one field in Rx that is not a subset and not 
a superset and not equal to the corresponding field in Ry (Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002). 
For the following rules, all fields except destination port field in rule 1 are 
subset or equal to corresponding fields rule 2.  
1: tcp, 192.168.1.3, any, *.*.*.*, 21, accept  
2: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, *.*.*.*, 80, deny  
 
Correlated: Rules Rx and Ry are correlated if some fields in Rx that are subset 
or equal to the corresponding field in Ry, and the rest of fields in Rx are supersets of the 
corresponding fields in Ry (Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002). 
For the following rules, below protocol, source port and destination port fields 
in rule 1 are equals to corresponding fields in rule 2 src_ip field in rule1 is subset of 
src_ip field in rule 2 and dst_ip field in rule 1 is superset of dst_ip field in rule 2. 
1: tcp, 192.168.1.3, any, *.*.*.*, 80, accept  
2: tcp, *.*.*.*, any, 192.168.1.*, 80, deny  
2.4.1. Intra-Firewall Policy Anomalies 
“An intra-firewall policy anomaly is defined as the existence of two or more 
filtering rules that may match the same packet” (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005). Anomaly types 
which are classified in Appendix B as follows: 
Shadowing anomaly: if all the fields in a rule match all the fields in a previous 
rule, this rule will never be worked through and shadowing anomaly will be occurred. 
If the shadowing rule is removed the security policy will not be affected. (Al-Shaer, et 
al. 2005) 
Example rules for cases (1) (2) are shown below: 
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Case (1) 
1: tcp, 140.192.37.*, any, 192.168.1.12, 80, accept 
2: tcp, 140.192.37.*, any, 192.168.1.12, 80, deny 
  
Case (2) 
1: tcp, *.*.*.*, any, 192.168.1.12, 80, accept 
2: tcp, 140.192.37.*, any, 192.168.1.12, 80, deny 
Rule 2 is shadowed by rule 1 in the examples above. 
Correlation anomaly: if some fields in first rule match corresponding fields in 
second rule and some fields in second rule match corresponding rules in first rule and if 
these rules have different action fields these rules  have correlation anomaly. (Al-Shaer, 
et al. 2005). 
Example rule for case (3) is shown below: 
Case (3) 
1: tcp, 192.168.1.20, any, *.*.*.*, 80, deny 
2: tcp, *.*.*.*, any, 192.168.33.40, 80, accept 
Rule 1 is in correlation with rule 2 in example above. 
Generalization anomaly: if fields in second rule match all corresponding fields 
in first rule and they have different action, second rule is generalization of first rule (Al-
Shaer, et al. 2005). 
Example rule for case (4) is shown below: 
Case (4) 
1: tcp, 192.168.1.20, any, *.*.*.*, 80, deny 
2: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, *.*.*.*, 80, accept 
Rule 2 is a generalization of rule 1 in example above. 
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Redundancy anomaly: a redundant rule performs same action on the same 
fields as another rule. If the redundant rule is removed policy will not be affected (Al-
Shaer, et al. 2005). 
Example rules for cases (5), (6) are shown below: 
Case (5) 
1: tcp, 192.168.37.*, any, 140.192.33.40, 21, accept 
2: tcp, 192.168.37.*, any, 140.192.33.40, 21, accept 
 
Case (6) 
1: tcp, 192.168.37.*, any, *.*.*.*, 21, accept 
2: tcp, 192.168.37.*, any, 140.192.33.40, 21, accept 
Rule 2 is redundant to rule 1 in examples above. 
2.4.2. Inter-Firewall Policy Anomalies 
In distributed firewall environment, if any two firewalls on a network path take 
different filtering actions, an inter-firewall anomaly may exist. For example a firewall 
might block a traffic that is permitted by another firewall on the same network path. 
Al-Shaer, Hamed, Boutaba and Hasan classified anomalies in multi-firewall 
environments (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005). And they used network model that is illustrated in 
Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5. Cascaded Firewalls Isolating Domains Dx and Dy. 
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 As it is shown Figure2.5 traffic stream is flowing from subdomain Dx to 
subdomain Dy . According to direction of flow, the closest firewall to the flow source 
subdomain is called upstream firewall (FWx) while the closest firewall to the flow 
destination subdomain is called downstream firewall (FWy).  
Shadowing anomaly: if an upstream firewall blocks the network traffic 
accepted by a downstream shadowing anomaly occurs. Rd belongs to downstream 
firewall’s policy while Ru belongs to upstream firewall’s policy (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005). 
Example rules for cases (1), (2), (3), (4) are shown below: 
Case (1) 
Ru: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.22.5, 21, deny 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.22.5, 21, accept 
 
Case (2) 
Ru: tcp, *.*.*.*, any, *.*.*.*, any, deny 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.22.5, 21, accept 
 
Case (3) 
Ru: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.22.5, 25, deny 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.*.*, 21, accept 
 
Case (4) 
Ru: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.*.*, 23, accept 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.*.*, 23, accept 
Spuriousness anomaly: if an upstream firewall permits the network traffic 
denied by a downstream, a spuriousness anomaly occurs (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005). 
Example rules for cases (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) are shown below: 
Case (5) 
Ru: tcp, 140.192.*.*, any, 192.168.*.*, 80, accept 
Rd: tcp, 140.192.*.*, any, 192.168.*.*, 80, deny 
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Case (6) 
Ru: tcp, 140.192.*.*, any, 192.168.*.*, 80, accept 
Rd: tcp, *.*.*.*, any, *.*.*.*, any, deny 
 
Case (7) 
Ru: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.*.*, 23, accept 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.37.*, 23, accept 
   
Case (8) 
Ru: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.*.*, 21, accept 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.*.*, any, 140.192.22.5, 21, accept 
 
Case (9) 
Ru: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.37.1, 23, deny 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.37.*, 23, deny 
 
Redundancy anomaly: if a down stream firewall denies the network traffic 
already blocked by upstream firewall a redundancy anomaly occurs (Al-Shaer, et al. 
2005). 
Example rules for cases (10), (11) are shown below: 
Case (10) 
Ru: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.37.1, 80, deny 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.37.1, 80, deny 
  
Case (11) 
Ru: tcp, *.*.*.*, any, *.*.*.*, any, deny 
Rd: tcp, 192.168.1.*, any, 140.192.37.1, 80, deny 
 
Correlation anomaly: as a result of having two correlated rules in upstream 
and downstream firewall a correlation anomaly occurs (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005). 
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Case (12) 
Ru: tcp, 140.192.*.*, any, 192.168.1.*, 80, accept 
Rd: tcp, 140.192.37.1, any, 192.168.*.*, 80, accept 
In this example, only the traffic coming from 140.192.37.1 and destined to 
192.168.1.* will be accepted and other traffic destined to 192.168.*.* will be shadowed 
at the upstream firewall 
Case (13) 
Ru: tcp, 140.192.*.*, any, 192.168.1.*, 80, deny 
Rd: tcp, 140.192.37.1, any, 192.168.*.*, 80, deny 
In this case, the traffic coming from 140.192.37.1 and destined to 192.168.1.* 
will deny at the downstream firewall.  
Case (14) 
Ru: tcp, 140.192.*.*, any, 192.168.1.*, 80, accept 
Rd: tcp, 140.192.37.1, any, 192.168.*.*, 80, deny 
In this example upstream firewall permits the traffic which is coming from 
140.192.37.1 while same traffic is denied at the downstream firewall 
Case (15) 
Ru: tcp, 140.192.*.*, any, 192.168.1.*, 80, deny 
Rd: tcp, 140.192.37.1, any, 192.168.*.*, 80, accept 
In this example, upstream firewall blocks the traffic which is coming from 
140.192.37.1 and destined to 192.168.1.* while same traffic is accepted at the 
downstream firewall. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF  
POLICY ANOMALY CHECKER  
 
Firewall functionality depends on the filtering rules and their order. If there is 
an anomaly among rules, correct and efficient operation can not be achieved. In this 
chapter, design and implementation of Policy Anomaly Checker is explained. 
3.1. Requirements of Policy Anomaly Checker  
Policy Anomaly Checker application is developed to discover firewall policy 
anomalies. The main requirement is to define anomalies among policy rules by using 
firewall rules relations and policy representation model which is introduced by Al-
Shaer and Hamed (2002). 
3.1.1. Functional Requirements of Policy Anomaly Checker 
The functional requirements of Policy Anomaly Checker are based around three 
main use cases which are Intra-firewall anomaly checking, inter-firewall anomaly 
checking and rule generation. 
3.1.1.1. Intra-Firewall Anomaly Checking 
In this requirement rules in the selected policy are checked in order to discover 
anomaly. Policy can be selected from either network topology that is already defined or 
file system. 
Input:     Selected policy. 
Process: Check intra-firewall anomaly. 
Output:  Results of the intra-firewall anomaly checking process. 
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3.1.1.2. Inter-Firewall Anomaly Checking 
Rules in all policies are checked in order to discover anomaly. In order to 
achieve this requirement all network paths between subdomains must be already 
defined in the system. 
Input:      Network paths between subdomains, firewall policies that are  
      deployed on these paths. 
Process:   Check inter-firewall anomaly. 
Output:    Results of the inter-firewall anomaly checking process. 
3.1.1.3. Rule Generation 
 Beside anomaly checking property, rule generation functionality is added to 
Policy Anomaly Checker. Rules are generated with or without anomaly according to 
user selection. 
Input:   Number of rules that will be generated, with anomaly or without      
     anomaly selection 
Process:  Generate firewall rules 
Output:   Generated rules with policy tree representation. 
3.2. Design Principles 
Object oriented development is a development strategy where analysis, design 
and programming process are executed to create and apply an object model. The 
concepts of application domain are implemented as objects and their interactions in the 
model. It is aimed to provide software reusability, extensibility, reliability and 
portability using such a development strategy.  
Design patterns strategies are applied during object oriented development 
process. Design patterns can be considered as pre-defined, repeatable and non-finished 
solutions. Similar problems can occur during different software development process. 
Instead of generating new solutions each time it is easier to use these pre-defined and 
reliable solutions which also generate a common language between developers.    
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Design patterns can be classified as creational, behavioral and structural patterns 
depending on the types of problems they are used to solve. During software 
development process of this thesis Singleton Pattern is applied. It is a creational pattern 
and used to restrict instantiation of a class to one object in the system (Cooper 2000).  
3.3. Architectural Layers of Policy Anomaly Checker 
Architectural layers of application are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The architecture 
consists of three layers which separates application functionality into three distinct 
abstractions.  
 
Figure 3.1. Architectural Layers of Policy Anomaly Checker 
3.3.1. Domain Layer of Policy Anomaly Checker 
Domain layer of the application is designed for the representation of business 
concepts (Figure 3.2). A policy consists of rules and their tree representation in model. 
Policy also contains its anomaly checker. Each rule has order, protocol, src_ip, dest_ip, 
src_port, dest_port and action fields. An interface class which is called Icategorization 
provides methods for building policy tree by using fields of the rules in a policy. An 
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abstract class which is called AbstractField provides methods for definition of relation 
between rules. 
 
Figure 3.2. Domain Layer of Policy Anomaly Checker 
3.3.2. Service Layer of Policy Anomaly Checker 
Service layer of the application is designed for the performing business rules. 
(Figure 3.3) An abstract class which is called AnomalyChecker provides methods for 
inter and intra-firewall anomaly checking. IntraAnomalyChecker and 
InterAnomalyChecker inherit anomalyTransition method from abstract class. 
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Figure 3.3. Service Layer of Policy Anomaly Checker 
3.3.3. User Interface Layer of Policy Anomaly Checker 
User interface layer is designed for the presentation of policy and network 
topology trees (Figure 3.4). There are two singleton classes which are called 
PolicyTreeFormController and TopologyController. TopologyController class provides 
method for creation of the policies using network paths which are defined from the 
network topology. In order to discover inter-firewall anomalies, policies must be 
defined in system.  PolicyTreeFormController class provides methods for presentation 
of policy and topology trees in the user interface layer. ReportForm class is used to 
show the results of the anomaly checking process to user. 
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Figure 3.4. User Interface Layer of Policy Anomaly Checker 
3.5. Algorithms 
Policy anomalies can be determined based on anomaly definitions in chapter 2. 
In order to discover policy anomalies for intra and inter-firewall environment, two 
algorithms that are introduced by Al-Shaer and Hamed (2004) are implemented. 
3.5.1. Intra-Firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm 
In tree representation of policy, if any two rules share the same tree path 
explained in 2.3.1, there is a potential anomaly among these rules. The basic idea of 
intra-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm is to determine anomalies while building 
the policy tree. This algorithm is shown in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. Intra-Firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm                                           
(Source: Al-Shaer and Hamed 2004) 
Intra-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm invokes main function: an anomaly 
transition function which represents the transition states of fields in the state diagram 
(Figure 3.6).  
 
Figure 3.6. State Diagram for Detecting Intra-firewall Anomalies for Rules Rx and Ry             
       (Source: Al-Shaer and Hamed 2004)  
Anomaly discovery states for any two rules Rx and Ry are illustrated in Figure 
3.6. Rx and Ry are in the same firewall and Rx comes after Ry in policy rule set. Source 
and destination fields for ips and ports are represented as a one field in diagram for 
simplification. State transition starts with protocol field. Each field in Rx is compared to 
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the corresponding field in Ry. Result of subsequent comparison determines the relation 
between rules.  If every field of Rx is a subset or equal to the corresponding field in Ry 
and both rules have the same action, Rx is redundant to Ry, while if the actions are 
different, Rx is shadowed by Ry. If every field of Rx is a superset or equal to the 
corresponding field in Ry and both rules have the same action, Rx is potentially 
redundant to Ry, while if the actions are different, Ry is a generalization of Rx. If some 
fields of Rx are subsets or equal to the corresponding fields in Ry, and some fields of Rx 
are supersets to the corresponding fields in Ry, and their actions are different, then Rx is 
in correlation with Ry (Al-Shaer and Hamed 2004). 
AnomalyTransition function is invoked for every rule with an 
UNDETERMINED relation. This algorithm is modified in order to create separate path 
for rule which has anomaly. Since the algorithm does not provide separate rule 
placement for rules which also appears on other rule branches. Modified algorithm is 
illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
If the field of the rule that is added to policy tree matches an already existing 
field in the tree then next relation state is determined base on the shown state diagram 
in Figure 3.5. 
The algorithm is executed recursively to check the remaining fields. Relation 
state is updated until the final field is reached. If there is no determined relation, new 
branch is created at the current node. 
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Figure 3.7. Modified Anomaly Transition Algorithm 
When all the fields of rule have been inserted in the tree, 
IntraAnomalyTermination function is executed. This algorithm is modified in order to 
add action field to the tree. Since the algorithm does not provide addition of action 
field. Modified algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8. Modified Anomaly Termination Algorithm 
In IntraAnomalyTermination function, if the rule action coincides with the 
action of another rule on the tree, an anomaly is discovered and rule is inserted in the 
rule’s node. At that point the final anomaly state is determined and any anomalies are 
reported.  
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3.5.2. Inter-Firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm 
Inter-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm (Figure 3.9) is implemented in order 
to find relations and discover anomalies between rules in two or more connected 
firewalls. 
 
Figure 3.9. Inter-Firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm       
(Source: Al-Shaer and Hamed 2004) 
The inter-firewall anomaly discovery process should be performed on all 
firewalls in the path connecting any two sub-domains in the network. The all possible 
paths between subdomains in the network must be determined before the execution of 
the algorithm. For example in Figure 3.10 there are six distinct paths between 
subdomains. Traffic flow from D1.1 to Internet {FW1, FW0} is one path and {FW1, 
FW0, FW2} is another path for the traffic from D1.2 to D2.2. 
Inter-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm takes a path list as parameter. For 
every firewall in the path firstly intra-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm (Figure 3.5) 
is executed to ensure that every individual firewall is free from intra-firewall 
anomalies. Next, for the most upstream firewall policy tree is built and the rules of all 
the consecutive firewalls in the path are added into this tree.   
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Figure 3.10. Example for a Distributed Firewall Environment 
Same AnomalyTransiton function is used for both Inter-firewall anomaly 
discovery algorithm and intra-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm. However, 
different AnomalyTermination function is invoked for the inter-firewall anomaly 
discovery algorithm.  
InterAnomalyTermination function determines the anomaly based on the 
discovered relation and the actions of the currently inserted rule with the existing rule 
in the upstream policy. This algorithm is also modified in order to add action field to 
the tree. Since the algorithm which is introduced by Al-Shaer and Hamed (2004) does 
not provide addition of action field. Modified algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3.11 
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Figure 3.11. Modified InterAnomaly Termination Algorithm 
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3.6. Implementation of Policy Anomaly Checker 
Application development environment and main scenario is explained in 
implementation of Policy Anomaly Checker. In addition, user interfaces of application 
are also described in this section. 
3.6.1. Application Development Environment 
Policy Anomaly Checker is developed on Java platform using Eclipse. Version 
of Java that is used in application development is JDK1.5.0.6 
3.6.2. Scenarios and User Interfaces  
Scenarios and user interface of Policy Anomaly Checker is described in this 
section.  
3.6.2.1. Scenarios 
 Policy Anomaly Checker has three main scenarios. First scenario is the intra-
firewall anomaly checking that is illustrated in Figure 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.12. Sequence Diagram for Intra-firewall Anomaly Checking 
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When user selects a “Discover Intra-firewall Anomaly” menu item from user 
interface of the application, firstly related policy object is pulled from 
TopologyController class and its PolicyTree object is shown on the user interface’s 
tree. If PolicyTree of this object has not built yet, IntraAnomalyChecker object is used 
to built PolicyTree and get its anomaly results. 
Second scenario is the inter-firewall anomaly checking which is illustrated in 
Figure 3.13. When user selects a “Discover Inter-firewall Anomaly” menu item from 
user interface of the application, firstly network paths which are defined in a properties 
file are pulled from TopologyControl class. For each path in the network paths, policies 
which are installed in this path are pulled from TopologyControl class and 
InterAnomalyChecker checks the anomaly for these policies’s rule set. Anomaly results 
are shown on the report form.   
 
Figure 3.13. Sequence Diagram for Inter-firewall Anomaly Checking 
Last scenario is the rule generation which is illustrated in Figure 3.14. In the 
rule generation scenario when user selects a “Generate Rules Without Anomaly” menu 
item from the user interface, firstly a service object which is called RuleGenerator is 
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created. Policy which is belonging to generated rules is created by RuleGenerator class. 
Generated rules are added to this Policy. In the rule addition process anomaly is 
checked between newly added rule and other rules in the policy. If there is an anomaly 
between rules, newly added rule is removed and new rule is generated. This process is 
repeated until an anomaly free rule is found. In this scenario, generated rules can be 
saved to selected files. 
 
Figure 3.14. Sequence Diagram for Rule Generation without Anomaly 
3.6.2.2. User Interfaces 
User interface of Policy Anomaly Checker consists of three main panels which 
are called Topology Tree, Policy Tree and Rule List (Figure C.1). Topology tree is used 
to presentation of policies in the network topology. Policy tree is used to presentation 
of rules in the selected policy.  On the Rule List Panel, rules are shown as a table for 
selected policy. Intra-firewall anomaly discovery is achieved by Anomaly Detection 
Menu (Figure C.2). It is achieved by Show Rules and Discover Anomaly Menu from 
TopologyTree (Figure C.3). As illustrated in Figure C.3 in order to execute Anomaly 
Discovery process, a policy must be selected from Topology Tree. 
  
33 
 For intra-firewall anomaly checking and inter-firewall anomaly checking 
scenarios, result of the processes are shown on to Anomalies Form (Figure C.4). In 
order to generate random or anomaly free rules Rule Generator Menu is used (Figure 
C.5).  
3.7. Test Cases 
Execution of intra and inter-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm is tested for 
all the possible anomaly cases which are explained in Chapter 2. Necessary rules are 
generated and algorithms are executed with these rules for cases. 
3.7.1. Intra-Anomaly Discovery Algorithm Test Cases 
Intra-firewall anomaly algorithm is executed for six cases which are explained 
in section 2.4.1. Results for each case are shown in Figure 3.15. 
 
Figure 3.15. Intra-Anomaly Discovery Algorithm Results for Anomaly Cases 
3.7.2. Inter-Anomaly Discovery Algorithm Test Cases 
Inter-firewall anomaly algorithm is executed for fifteen cases which are 
explained in section 2.4.2. Network topology which is used in test has two firewalls; 
FW1 and FW2. FW1 is defined as upstream firewall; FW2 is defined as downstream 
firewall.  Results for each case are shown in Figure 3.16. 
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Figure 3.16. Inter-Anomaly Discovery Algorithm Results for Anomaly Cases 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
 
In order to obtain operational values of intra and inter-firewall anomaly 
discovery algorithms, a number of tests are performed using different policies and 
network topologies. These tests are performed on a Pentium IV-M 1.73 GHz. processor 
with 1.49 GByte of RAM.  
In order to obtain operational values of intra-firewall anomaly discovery 
algorithm, four sets of firewall rules are generated. The first set includes rules that have 
different destination address only, and the second set includes rules that have distinct 
source addresses. These two represent the best case scenario because they require the 
minimum policy-tree navigation for analyzing each rule. In the third set, each rule is a 
superset match of the preceding rule. This set represents the worst case scenario 
because each rule requires complete policy-tree navigation in order to analyze the entire 
rule set. The fourth set includes rules that are randomly selected from the three previous 
sets in order to represent the average case scenario. Policy Anomaly Checker is used to 
execute intra-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm on each set using various sizes of 
rule sets (10–100 rules). In each case, processing time is measured. The results are 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
In order to obtain operational values of the inter-firewall anomaly discovery 
algorithm, two different experiments are performed. In the first experiment, the 
discovery algorithm is executed on a set of firewalls that exist on one network path. 
The rules that are used in each firewall are similar to set 2 rules in the previous test 
case. Number of rules in each firewall and the number of firewalls on the path is 
increased. The results are shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.1. Processing Time for Intra-firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm 
As illustrated in Figure 4.2 the processing time of the inter-firewall anomaly 
discovery algorithm is very close to processing time of intra-firewall algorithm for 
number of rules. For example, it takes 10 ms to analyze four firewalls each containing 
20 rules. This is almost equal to the time required to perform intra-firewall algorithm 
on a single firewall having 80 rules. 
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Figure 4.2. Inter-firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm for One Path 
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In the second experiment, inter-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm is 
executed for the different network topologies. Network paths which are used in the 
execution of anomaly discovery algorithm are created for three different networks. 
These networks are in the form of (1) 2-2-2, (2) 3-2-2 and (3) 3-3-2. For example, the 
root node in network 2 has 3 branches, whereas every node on levels two and three has 
two branches. For each network, a random set of filtering rules in each firewall are 
installed. In each network, the processing time required to produce the final policy 
anomaly report is measured. The results are shown in Figure 4.3. 
158
195
253
289 302
199
292
352
456
542
306
461
657
877
1105
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
10 20 30 40 50
Number of rules per firewall
Pr
o
ce
ss
in
g 
tim
e
 
(m
ill
is
e
co
n
d)
network1 (2-2-2)
network2 (3-2-2)
network3 (3-3-2)
 
Figure 4.3. Inter-firewall Processing Time 
These results indicate that inter-firewall anomaly algorithm is dependent on the 
total number of paths between sub-domains in the network. Since number of paths in 
network 3 is more than in other networks and network 3 has much processing time than 
others. 
Finally, in order to obtain operational values of the inter-firewall anomaly 
discovery algorithm in real distributed environment a number of experiments are 
performed. Experiment environment is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4. Environment used for experiment 
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Traffic flow from Internet to client machine is through fw1, fw2, fw3, fw4, fw5 
and traffic flow from client to Internet is through fw5, fw4, fw3, fw2, fw1. All firewalls 
are dual home hosts and connected with Ethernet cable from their standard 10/100Mbs 
PCI Ethernet cards to 48 port Cisco switches. Firewall configurations are illustrated in 
Appendix C. 
Policy Anomaly Checker is deployed on Pentium IV-M 1.73 GHz. processor 
with 1.49 GByte of RAM. In order to communicate with Firewall Agent, socket 
communication functionality is added to Policy Anomaly Checker. Firewall Agent is 
deployed on each firewall on the path. It is developed by using Python. The main 
functionality of Firewall Agent is to communicate firewall devices with Policy 
Anomaly Checker. Communication between Policy Anomaly Checker and Firewall 
Agent has four steps: 
Step1: Firewall Agent sends a new rule to Policy Anomaly Checker which will 
 be added to its policy. 
Step2: Policy Anomaly Checker receives the rule, checks the relation with other 
 rules and sends the anomaly result to Firewall Agent. 
Step3: If there is no anomaly determined, Firewall Agent adds the new rule to 
 its policy and sends the modified policy to the Policy Anomaly Checker. 
Step4: Firewall Agent displays a warning message. 
 Communication protocol between Policy Anomaly Checker and Firewall Agent 
as follows; 
Step1: Firewall Agent sends bor (begin of rule) message. 
Step2: Firewall Agent sends the new Rule. 
Step3: Firewall Agent sends eor (end of rule) message. 
Step4: Policy Anomaly Checker sends a string compiled of anomaly result. If 
 there is no anomaly sends ok message. 
Step5: Firewall Agent sends bof (begin of file) message. 
Step6: Firewall Agent sends policy file. 
Step7: Firewall Agent sends eof (end of file) message. 
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The test scenario is same with the number of firewalls in one path scenario 
which is illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
In order to reach Policy Anomaly Checker  
from fw2; fw1 must be passed through, 
from fw3; fw2 and fw1 must be passed through, 
from fw4; fw3, fw2 and fw1 must be passed through, 
from fw5; all firewalls on path must be passed through.  
First, a new rule is sent by Firewall Agent from the fw1 to Policy Anomaly 
Checker. When new rule is received, it is added to its policy which is defined in Policy 
Anomaly Checker and inter-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm is executed with this 
new policy. At the end of the algorithm anomaly results is sent back to Firewall Agent. 
This test is repeated for each firewall on the path. Total response time and inter-firewall 
anomaly discovery algorithm process time is measured for each firewall. Total response 
time is measured by the Firewall Agent, inter-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm 
process time is measured by the Policy Anomaly Checker and latency time is measured 
using (total response time - discovery algorithm process time) formula.
 
The results are 
shown in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.5. Experiment for Inter-firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm Using One     
         Path Only (Total Response Time and Latency Values) 
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Figure 4.6 Experiment for Inter-firewall Anomaly Discovery Algorithm Using One 
        Path Only (Discovery Algorithm Process Time) 
These results indicate that inter-firewall anomaly discovery algorithm process 
time is very close to process time which is aforementioned in Chapter 3 for inter-
firewall anomaly discovery algorithm process and it depends on the total number of 
rules in all firewalls. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this thesis anomaly discovery algorithms for single and distributed 
environments are implemented in a software tool called “Policy Anomaly Checker”. 
Besides its anomaly discovery functionality, anomaly free rule set generation 
functionality is added to this tool. 
 Correct operation of the firewall is dependent on the filtering rules and their 
order. If the same packet matches more than one filtering rule in a policy, an intra-
firewall anomaly may exist. If any two firewalls on a network path take different 
filtering actions, an inter-firewall anomaly may exist. All rule relation must be 
considered in order to determine correct rule order.   
Mathematical background and related algorithms are available in literature. 
Although it is implied in (Al-Shaer and Hamed 2004) that an implementation exists and 
some experimental results are given, implementation details are not explained. So 
Policy Anomaly Checker is implemented using object oriented techniques in Java. Test 
cases are created. 
Policy Anomaly Checker now only checks anomalies for intra and inter- 
firewall environments. Rule addition and rule removal functionality can be added for 
policy management. Other algorithms (Cuppens, et al. 2005) can be implemented and 
Intra and inter-firewall anomaly algorithms can be compared with other algorithms. 
Policy Anomaly Checker can be used in campus environment in order to determine its 
usability.   
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APPENDIX A  
 
DEFINITIONS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RULES 
 
ℜ is the universal set of rule relation  and   ℜ= {RCD,RPD,REM,RIM,RC} 
Definition 1: Rules Rx and Ry are exactly matched if every field in Rx is equal 
to the corresponding field in Ry. Formally:  
Rx ℜEM Ry iff   
∀ i: Rx[i] = Ry[i]  
where i ∈ {protocol, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port} (Al-Shaer and Hamed  
2002). 
Definition 2: Rules Rx and Ry are inclusively matched if they do not exactly 
match and if every field in Rx is a subset or equal to the corresponding field in Ry. 
Formally:  
Rx ℜIM Ry iff  
∀ i : Rx[i] ⊆ Ry[i] and ∃ j such that: Rx[j] ≠ Ry[j]  
where i, j ∈ {protocol, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port}  
In this relation, Rx is called the subset match while Ry is called the superset 
match (Al-Shaer and Hamed 2002). 
Definition 3: Rules Rx and Ry are completely disjoint if every field in Rx is not 
a subset and not a superset and not equal to the corresponding field in Ry. Formally:  
Rx ℜCD Ry iff  
∀ i : Rx[i] / Ry[i]  
where   ∈ {⊃,⊂, =}, i ∈{protocol, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port}     (Al-
Shaer and Hamed  2002). 
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Definition 4: Rules Rx and Ry are partially disjoint (or partially matched) if 
there is at least one field in Rx that is a subset or a superset or equal to the 
corresponding field in Ry, and there is at least one field in Rx that is not a subset and not 
a superset and not equal to the corresponding field in Ry. Formally:  
Rx ℜPD Ry   iff  
∃ i,j such that : Rx[i]    Ry[i]  and Rx[j] /  Ry[j]   
where  ∈ {⊃,⊂, =}and  i,j ∈ {protocol, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port} 
(Al-Shaer and Hamed  2002). 
Definition 5: Rules Rx and Ry are correlated if some fields in Rx that are subset 
or equal to the corresponding field in Ry, and the rest of fields in Rx are supersets of the 
corresponding fields in Ry. Formally:  
Rx ℜC Ry iff  
∀ i :  Rx[i]  Ry[i]  and 
∃ i,j such that : Rx[i] ⊂ Ry[i]  and : Rx[j] ⊃ Ry[j]   
where      ∈ {⊃,⊂,=}and  i,j ∈{protocol, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port} 
 (Al-Shaer and Hamed  2002). 
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APPENDIX B  
 
ANOMALY TYPES  
 
Intra-Firewall Anomaly Types: 
Shadowing anomaly: Formally rule Ry is shadowed by rule Rx if one of the 
following conditions holds:                          
Rx [order]<Ry [order], Rx ℜEM Ry, Rx [action] ≠ Ry [action] (1) 
Rx[order]<Ry [order], Ry ℜIM Rx, Rx [action] ≠ Ry [action]  (2)  (Al-Shaer, et al. 
2005)                       
Correlation anomaly: Formally rule Rx and rule Ry have correlation anomaly 
the following condition holds: 
Rx ℜC Ry, Rx [action] ≠ Ry [action] (3)  (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005) 
Generalization anomaly: Formally rule Ry is generalization of rule Rx if the 
following condition holds: 
Rx [order] < Ry [order], Rx ℜIM Ry, Rx [action] ≠ Ry [action]  (4)  (Al-Shaer, et 
al. 2005) 
Redundancy anomaly: Formally rule Ry is redundant to rule Rx if one of the 
following conditions holds: 
Rx [order] < Ry [order], Rx ℜEM Ry, Rx [action] = Ry [action] (5) 
Rx [order] < Ry [order], Ry ℜIM Rx, Rx [action] = Ry [action]  (6)  (Al-Shaer, et 
al. 2005) 
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Inter-Firewall Anomaly Types: 
Shadowing anomaly: Formally rule Rd is shadowed by rule Ru if one of the 
following conditions holds: 
Rd ℜEM Ru, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] = accept (1) 
Rd ℜIM Ru, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] = accept (2) 
Ru ℜIM Rd, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] = accept (3) 
Ru ℜIM Rd, Ru [action] = accept, Rd [action] = accept (4) (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005) 
Spuriousness anomaly: Formally rule Ru allows spurious traffic to rule Rd if 
one of the following conditions holds: 
Ru ℜEM Rd, Ru [action] = accept, Rd [action] = deny (5) 
Ru ℜIM Rd, Ru [action] = accept, Rd [action] = deny (6) 
Rd ℜIM Ru, Ru [action] = accept, Rd [action] = deny (7) 
Rd ℜIM Ru, Ru [action] = accept, Rd [action] = accept (8) 
Ru ℜIM Rd, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] deny (9) (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005) 
  
Redundancy anomaly: Formally rule Rd is redundant to rule Ru if one of the 
following conditions holds: 
Rd ℜEM Ru, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] = deny (10) 
Rd ℜIM Ru, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] = deny (11) (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005) 
Correlation anomaly: as a result of having two correlated rules in upstream 
and downstream firewall a correlation anomaly occurs. Formally, the correlation 
anomaly for rules Ru and Rd occurs if one of the following conditions holds: 
Ru ℜC Rd, Ru [action] = accept, Rd [action] = accept (12) 
Ru ℜC Rd, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] = deny (13) 
Ru ℜC Rd, Ru [action] = accept, Rd [action] = deny (14) 
Ru ℜC Rd, Ru [action] = deny, Rd [action] = accept (15) (Al-Shaer, et al. 2005) 
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APPENDIX C  
 
USER INTERFACES OF POLICY ANOMALY CHECKER 
 
 
Figure C.1. User Interface of the Policy Anomaly Checker 
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Figure C.2. User Interface of the Policy Anomaly Checker with Anomaly Detection 
        Menu 
 
Figure C.3. User Interface of the Policy Anomaly Checker with Topology Menu 
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Figure C.4. Anomaly Result Form 
 
Figure C.5. Rule Generation Menu 
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APPENDIX D  
 
FIREWALL CONFIGURATIONS 
 
The firewalls are configured via iptables. Route definitions of fw1 to fw5 as 
follows. 
fw1 route tables: 
 
# route –n 
 
Kernel IP routing table 
 
Destination     Gateway         Genmask         Flags Metric Ref    Use Iface 
10.2.0.34        10.2.0.33        255.255.255.255 UGH    0      0        0 eth1 
10.2.0.35        10.2.0.33        255.255.255.255 UGH    0      0        0 eth1 
10.2.0.36        10.2.0.33        255.255.255.255 UGH    0      0        0 eth1 
10.2.0.37        10.2.0.33        255.255.255.255 UGH    0      0        0 eth1 
10.2.0.0         10.2.0.1         255.255.255.0   UG     0      0        0 eth1 
10.2.0.0         0.0.0.0          255.255.255.0   U       0      0        0 eth1 
192.168.1.0 0.0.0.0          255.255.255.0   U       0      0        0 eth0 
10.1.0.0         10.1.0.1         255.255.255.0   UG      0      0        0 eth2 
10.1.0.0         0.0.0.0          255.255.255.0   U       0      0        0 eth2 
0.0.0.0          192.168.1.3     0.0.0.0         UG      0      0        0 eth0 
 
 
Fw2 route tables: 
 
# route -n 
 
Kernel IP routing table 
 
Destination     Gateway         Genmask           Flags Metric Ref    Use  Iface 
10.2.0.35 10.2.0.34 255.255.255.0 UGH 0 0 0 eth0 
10.2.0.36 10.2.0.34 255.255.255.0 UGH 0 0 0 eth0 
10.2.0.37 10.2.0.34 255.255.255.0 UGH 0 0 0 eth0 
10.2.0.0         0.0.0.0          255.255.255.0   U      0       0         0 eth0 
0.0.0.0          10.2.0.33        0.0.0.0          UG     0       0         0  eth0 
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fw3 route tables: 
# route -n 
 
Kernel IP routing table 
Destination     Gateway         Genmask           Flags Metric Ref    Use  Iface 
10.2.0.36 10.2.0.35 255.255.255.0 UGH 0 0 0 eth0 
10.2.0.37 10.2.0.35 255.255.255.0 UGH 0 0 0 eth0 
10.2.0.0         0.0.0.0          255.255.255.0   U      0       0         0 eth0 
0.0.0.0          10.2.0.33        0.0.0.0          UG     0       0         0  eth0 
  
By these route definitions, any package that is sent from client to the anomaly 
checker will follow the firewalls from bottom to the fw1.  
 
Fw4 route tables: 
 
# route -n 
 
Kernel IP routing table 
 
Destination     Gateway         Genmask           Flags Metric Ref    Use  Iface 
10.2.0.37 10.2.0.36 255.255.255.0 UGH 0 0 0 eth0 
10.2.0.0         0.0.0.0          255.255.255.0   U      0       0         0 eth0 
0.0.0.0          10.2.0.34        0.0.0.0          UG     0       0         0  eth0 
 
 
